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Article 8

International Factors Influencing Australian Governm ents'
Responses To The Indochinese Refugee Problem
James E. Coughlan

Introduction
T h e yea r 1975 w as an im portant year for Australia: the econom y
had plunged into a severe recession, with high unem ploym ent and
interest rates, the w orst since the 1930s depression: the G overnm ent
was rocked b y m inisterial involvem ent in a m ajor illegal international
loans scandal: and a variety o f other significant political disruptions,
which culm inated in the m ost serious constitutional crisis in Australian
p olitical h istory— the dism issal b y the G overn or-G en eral, Q u een
E lizabeth’s representative in Australia, o f the elected Labor Prim e
M inister Gough W hitlam . There was one significant international event
in 1975 which w ould have m ajor political and social ram ifications for
Australia over the follow ing decades: the revolutionary changes in the
Cam bodian, Lao and Vietnam ese Governm ents.
T h e com m unist victories in the three countries which used to
com prise French Indochina triggered two types o f large-scale population
m ovem ents: the forced deurbanization o f Cam bodia and governm ent
population relocation program m es in Vietnam on one hand, and the
exodus o f over two m illion Indochinese asylum seekers on the other.
Although the m agnitude o f the exodus o f Indochinese asylum seekers
over the past decade and a h a lf is sm aller than some o f the other
contem porary refugee crises, its direct effect on the international
com m unity has been substantial, largely due to the influence o f the
United States Governm ent. For Australia, the decision to adm it alm ost
150,000 Indochinese refugees and im m igrants in the decade and a h a lf
since early 1975 has had a significant direct and indirect im pact on the
social fabric o f A u stralian society.
The aim o f this article is to discuss som e of the international
factors which have contributed to A u stralia’s Indochinese refugee policy
form ulation since early 1975, with only passing attention given to
dom estic considerations. The article also seeks to show that the
overw helm ing determ inant of A u stralia’s Indochinese refugee policy has
not been dom estic or hum anitarian considerations, but rath er the
political desires o f the Australian G overnm ent and the D epartm ent o f
Foreign Affairs and Trade (the Australian equivalent o f the US Departm ent
o f State) to im prove A u stralia’s relations with Asia, especially with the
A ssociation o f South East A sian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Brunei
D arussalam , Indonesia, M alaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
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Thailand. Thus, like the United States o f Am erica. A u stralia’s recent
refugee policy has been more o f a foreign policy tool than an im plem ent
o f G overnm ent hum anitarian concern.
The following section will provide a short background to Australia’s
overall refugee policy, which will be followed b y a discussion o f the
international factors which have contributed to Indochinese refugee
policy formulation in the three Australian governments since the beginning
o f 1975. The final section presents a b rief discussion and conclusion o f
the issues raised.
Background
Australia is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status o f Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status o f Refugees, and thus accepts the definition o f the term refugee
encom passed in these United Nations instruments. However, in m ore
recent tim es Australia, as well as other countries involved in Indochinese
refugee resettlem ent and the southeast and east Asian countries, has
narrowed its interpretation o f the term refugee. At the sam e time,
Australia is incorporating more stringent procedures in the determ ination
o f refugee status. This m odus operandi has been adopted not only in
order to separate the genuine political refugees from the econom ic
m igrants am ongst the asylum seekers, but m ore im portantly to ju stify
publicly the rejection, and possible m andatory repatriation, o f asylum
seekers who, the Government determines, are non-refugees.
Australia’s response to specific refugee situations takes into
account such factors as the m agnitude o f the specific refugee problem ,
the region in which the problem occurs and the strength and nature o f
Australia’s relationship with that region, with particular im portance
placed on the relationships with the country o f origin and country o f first
asylum o f the asylum seekers. A s with the USA, Australia’s refugee policy
was until recently based upon ad hoc responses to specific refugee
crises. A fter a considerable am ount o f dom estic and international
pressure in 1978 the Liberal Governm ent o f Prim e Minister, M alcolm
Fraser, introduced a regular refugee com ponent into Australia’s annual
im m igration programme. The form ulation o f a formalized refugee policy
in the late 1970s w as due to a num ber o f factors, the m ost im portant of
which w as the growing number o f refugee crises around the world and
the increasing pressure placed on Australia by various governm ents and
organisations to resettle refugees.
Australia is in a similar position, with regard to the Indochinese
asylum seekers, to the other Asian countries, and unlike other W estern
countries, in that it is both a country o f first asylum, that is a country
where asylum seekers initially seek refuge, and a third country, that is
a country o f refugee resettlement. Australia com m enced resettling
Indochinese refugees in 1975, when slightly m ore than one thousand
were resettled, though a substantial resettlem ent program me w as not in
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place until 1978, w hen over seven thousand w ere accepted. In late April
1976, alm ost a year after the com m unist take-over o f Saigon, the first
boat carrying Vietnam ese asylum seekers arrived on Australia’s northern
shores, heralding w hat would be the arrival o f over fifty boats o f first
asylum Vietnam ese boat people during the follow ing five years. In
addition, since late 1989 three boats carrying Cam bodian boat people
have successfully landed on Australian shores. The unannounced
arrival o f Indochinese boat people on A u stralia’s northern shores has
been a significant factor in the creation o f A u stralia’s policy tow ards the
Indochinese refugees.
A s a final background issue, at the beginning o f 1975, as part o f
the C olom bo Plan o f which Australia is a m em ber, there w ere over five
hundred Indochinese students sponsored by the Australian Governm ent
attending educational institutions in Australia. The m ajority o f these
students w ere from South Vietnam , but also included 19 students from
North V ietnam and six high school students nom inated by the Pathet
Lao faction in Laos. T h e Labor Governm ent under the Prim e M inister,
Gough W hitlam , had established diplom atic relations with North Vietnam
in 1973, and had actively worked to im prove relations between Australia
and North Vietnam . Following the changes o f governm ent in the three
Indochinese countries in 1975 Australia continued to provide a sm all
am ount o f developm ental and hum anitarian aid to Laos, although
sim ilar aid and cultural exchanges between Australia and the Socialist
Republic o f Vietnam were suspended in early 1979 follow ing V ietn am ’s
intervention in Cam bodia, influenced by the perception that Vietnam
was both profiting from and forcibly expelling Vietnam ese boat people.
However, since 1983 Australia has been involved in providing bilateral
and m ultilateral hum anitarian aid to Vietnam , and there have been a
small num ber o f cultural exchanges. Australian businesses have also
been active in assisting Vietnam.
The Whitlam Government’s Neglect: 1975
At the beginning o f 1975Australia maintained diplomatic relations
with the four nation states of Indochina and was providing developm ental
aid to these countries. The diversification o f Australia’s relations with
Asia, follow ing the election o f the W h itlam Governm ent in late 1972, w as
part o f W h itlam ’s b elief that Australian foreign policy should not be
restricted due to ideological and m ilitary considerations, but should also
include cultural and econom ic facets, and that Australia should seek to
expand its relations within the A sian region.
A s part o f the desire to restructure Australia’s foreign relations,
an im portant initiative o f the W hitlam Governm ent w as the form al
abolition o f the W h ite Australia Policy and the adoption o f a policy o f
m ulticulturalism initiated by the M inister for Immigration, M rA l Grassby.
The W h ite A u stralia Policy w as the com m on nam e given to the
Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which sought to restrict non Anglo-
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Celtic im m igrants from entering Australia. The historical backgrou nd to
this A ct is sim ilar to that o f com parable regulations enacted in Canada
and the U S A during the latter part o f the nineteenth century. There w ere
some provisions within the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 which
perm itted som e A sian people to im m igrate to Australia, though thennum bers were very small.
Since the end o f the Second W orld W a r there had been a grow ing
awareness on the part o f some Australians that Australia’s restrictions
on non Anglo-C eltic im m igration were presenting a negative im age o f
Australia internationally and ham pering A u stralia’s effectiveness in
international forum s. Upon its election the W h itlam Governm ent m oved
rapidly to form ally abolish the W hite Australia Policy, which resulted in
a m arginal increase in the proportion of Asian-born im m igrants settling
in A u stralia during the early years o f governm ent. However, the first
significant test for the non-discrim inatory nature o f A u stralia’s new
im m igration policy w as to come with the first Indochinese refugee crisis
o f early 1975.
In the spring o f 1975 W hitlam perceived that Australia w as not
in a position to accept Indochinese refugees, and w as in essence
unwilling to grant entry to Cam bodian and even Vietnam ese nationals
with A u stralian connections. T his perception arose due to a nu m ber of
factors. T h e Labor Party in Australia at the tim e w as m ore ideologically
aligned with the North Vietnam ese Governm ent, as well as the Provisional
Revolutionary Governm ent of South Vietnam , the Khm er Rouge and the
Pathet Lao factions, than the Am erican-backed regim es in Indochina. A t
the sam e time, som e o f those involved in the labour m ovem ent expressed
concern at the possibility o f having a large num ber o f V ietnam ese
workers in Australia, which could threaten the level o f wages o f Australian
workers, and thus the welfare o f Australian society. The G overnm ent
was concerned at a possible electoral backlash from both conservative
forces in society and its own supporters if Indochinese evacuees and
refugees were settled perm anently in Australia.
D uring April 1975 the Australian Labor Governm ent did not plan
to follow the US exam ple o f extracting Cam bodian and Vietnam ese
nationals w ho had connections with Australia or who w ere perceived as
being at risk after the com m unist victories. T h e W hitlam G overnm ent,
and especially som e o f its senior m inisters, appeared concerned with two
issues at this time: the desire not to offend North Vietnam by seem ing
to m eddle in the internal affairs o f South Vietnam through accepting
Vietnam ese nationals fleeing the advancing com m unist forces: and
concern at perm itting the entry o f a large num ber o f conservative South
Vietnam ese w ho it was felt m ight seek to disrupt Australia’s relations
with North Vietnam . By the time the com m unist forces had entered
Saigon less than a hundred Vietnam ese nationals had arrived in
Australia from Vietnam under special consideration. Up to the end o f
April 1975 the W hitlam Governm ent’s inaction in getting the rem aining
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fam ilies o f V ietnam ese already in Australia out o f South V ietnam , prior
to the com m u nist take over, brought it substantial criticism from the
opposition political parties, humanitarian organisations, som e academ ics
and the gen eral com m unity.
A fte r th e com m u n ist forces en tered S aigon th e W h itla m
G overnm ent experienced a substantial am ount o f condem nation, both
dom estically and internationally, directed at its lack o f response in
bringing out South Vietnam ese nationals with A ustralian connections.
The W h itlam G overnm ent had incorrectly interpreted the gen eral feeling
o f the population tow ards the situation o f the Vietnam ese in Australia,
and underestim ated the international criticism s it would be subject to.
Australia soon cam e under pressure from the United States and the
ASEAN countries, especially M alaysia and Singapore, to participate in
resettling som e o f the 130,000 Am erican-assisted evacuees and refugees
who had fled C am bodia and Vietnam . A s a result o f this pressure, two
im m igration officials w ere sent to Guam, H ong Kong, M alaysia and
Singapore to interview evacuees and refugees for entry to Australia. A t
the end o f this exercise in m id -1975 ju s t over one thousand V ietnam ese
were selected for entry into Australia. T his token response w as not
received enthusiastically both dom estically and internationally, and w as
viewed by som e A sian countries as an indication that the W h ite Australia
Policy w as not dead and buried as the W h itlam G overnm ent had
announced, w hile in certain dom estic quarters it added to the grow ing
public discontent w ith the W hitlam Governm ent. However, the dom estic
political situation w ith in Australia w as about to change and by the end
o f 1975 the W h itlam Governm ent had been sacked by the G overnorGeneral, S ir Joh n Kerr, and a new conservative (Liberal) G overnm ent
under M alcolm F raser had been elected.
In sum m ary, the position o f the W h itlam G overnm ent tow ards
the Indochinese evacuees and refugees in early 1975 w as that it did not
wish to offend and dam age relations with, the newly victorious governm ent
o f North Vietnam . However, after a significant am ount o f dom estic and
international pressure, m ainly from the ASEAN countries and the United
States, the G overnm ent acquiesced and accepted a token nu m ber o f
Indochinese evacuees and refugees. The policy towards the Indochinese
refugees during 1975 w as initially determ ined by some powerful m em bers
o f the W h itlam G overnm ent, w ho largely ignored the requests o f dom estic
and international pressure groups. T h e view s o f som e other G overnm ent
m em bers w h o thought that A u stralia should do som ething to assist the
evacuees and refugees were largely ignored.
The Fraser Government’s Initiatives: 1976— 1983
T h e first concerted attem pt to develop a refugee policy w ith in the
fram ew ork o f overall im m igration policy cam e in 1977 under the Fraser
G overnm ent at the instigation o f the then M inister for Im m igration and
Ethnic A ffairs, M ichael M acKellar. In the form ulation o f an Indochinese
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refugee policy the task at hand w as to balance various dom estic and
international considerations, w hile at the sam e time attem pting to
project to the international com m unity, especially the A sian region, the
im age o f A u stralia as a responsible m em ber o f the A sian -Pacific
com m unity. T h e Fraser Governm ent, like the W hitlam G overnm ent
before it, recognised the im portance o f developing m ore substantial
relations w ith A u stralia’s Asian neighbours.
D uring the late 1970s an im portant feature o f the developm ent
o f refugee policy w ithin the overall im m igration program m e w as the
form al structural incorporation o f the then Departm ent o f Foreign
Affairs, now the Departm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, into refugee
policy form ulation. Though the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs had had
input into A u stralia’s ad hoc refugee policy determ ination previously,
there w as no particular section w ithin the Departm ent which had
responsibility for this matter. A s an aside, it is im portant to note that
since the onset o f the Indochinese refugee phenom enon the D epartm ent
o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade has consistently recom m ended a higher
intake o f Indochinese refugees than the Departm ent o f Im m igration,
Local G overnm ent and Ethnic Affairs. Th e Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs
and Trade believed that if Australia resettled a large num ber o f Indochinese
refugees, then it follow ed that Australia would be perceived as being a
responsible m em ber o f the A sian region, and this perception in turn
could be used as a tool by Australia to im prove its regional relations with
the A sian countries, especially the ASEAN countries, and, probably m ost
im portantly, Indonesia. A s a result o f the perceived im portance o f the
Indochinese refugees in Australia’s bilateral and m ultilateral relations,
a “refugee section” w as established in the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs
in early 1981.
In addition to raising A u stralia’s status and prestige w ithin the
A sian region, another m atter which also prom pted the A u stralian
Governm ent to take a m ore active role in the Indochinese refugee issue
w as the arrival o f ju s t over two thousand Vietnam ese boat people in 51
boats on A u stralia’s northern shores during 1976-1981, the largest
proportion arriving between 1978-1979. The arrival o f these refugees
sparked a heated debate in Australia, and in som e quarters old fears o f
an A sian invasion o f Australia resurfaced. The Governm ent w as concerned
with these unannounced arrivals for two reasons: fear o f the dom estic
political backlash if increasing num bers o f boat people w ere to arrive
unannounced in Australia, and the problem posed by genuine refugees
who w ould have to be resettled by Australia, although they w ould not
have been selected via norm al m igration procedures. The latter issue
w as o f concern to the Departm ent o f Im m igration and Ethnic Affairs as
Australia norm ally accepts the m ajority o f its im m igrants before they
enter Australia: in selecting refugees outside o f Australia im m igration
officials had the ability to select refugees who, they thought, w ould be
able to integrate successfully into A ustralian society. T h is pow er o f
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selection was not available in the case o f genuine refugees who landed
in Australia without prior selection, and thus the element o f controlled
selection was absent.
A s a result o f the unannounced arrival ofVietnam ese boat people
on Australia’s northern shores, the Governm ent made special advances
to the Indonesian Governm ent in an effort to persuade the Indonesians
to hold any Vietnam ese boat people who wanted to travel on to Australia.
If this request was met, Australia promised to take a greater num ber of
Vietnam ese boat people from Indonesian camps. Sim ilar advances were
made to the M alaysian Government, and in m id -1978 the Australian
Governm ent approached the US Governm ent and requested their
assistance in persuading the Indonesian and Malaysian Governm ents to
slop boats ofV ietn am ese refugees planning to go to Australia, in return
for Australia taking more refugees from Indonesian and M alaysian
refugee camps. This action would thus help the United States resettle
Indochinese refugees, while at the same time reducing the num ber of
refugees in Indonesia and Malaysia, but most im portantly it would
permit Australian im migration officials the opportunity to select the
refugees Australia wanted to resettle. In early 1979 when the Indonesian
Governm ent offered two islands as possible sites for an Indochinese
refugee processing centre, the Australian Governm ent was im m ediately
supportive o f this proposal and offered to m eet part o f the cost of
establishing such a centre.
The Australian position in 1978-80 was essentially to tiy to stop
Vietnam ese boat people from com ing directly to Australia by accepting
a large proportion o f its Indochinese refugee intake from the countries
from where the Vietnam ese boat people would most likely attem pt to
continue their jou rn ey to Australia, viz. Indonesia and Malaysia. During
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the refugee camp populations in
Indonesia and M alaysia were declining, and those in Hong Kong and
Thailand increasing, Australia continued to take the m ajority o f its
refugees from Indonesia and Malaysia, with m ost o f the intake from the
other Asian countries consisting only o f those refugees who had immediate
fam ily m em bers in Australia who were in a position to sponsor them out
of the refugee camps.
D uring the late 1970s, despite what it perceived as its adequate
response to the growing Indochinese refugee crisis, the Fraser Government
came under increasing international pressure from the first asylum
ASEAN countries, as well as the USA and the office o f the United Nations
High C om m issioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to resettle more o f the growing
num ber o f Indochinese asylum seekers arriving in Asian first asylum
countries. O n the domestic scene, the growing media coverage o f the
plight o f the Vietnam ese boat people and the horrific images o f em aciated
C am bodians en tering Thailand raised public con sciousness and
sympathy, thus perm itting the Government, now also under increasing
dom estic pressure, to raise more readily its intake quota o f Indochinese
refugees.
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Also in the late 1970s the Vietnam ese boat people situation
changed m arkedly with the arrival o f a num ber oflarge freighters in Asia
with thousands o f Vietnamese asylum seekers aboard. It soon becam e
apparent that the maj ority of people on these freighters had paid the local
equivalent o f thousands of dollars to leave Vietnam, and that their
departure from Vietnam had been arranged with the assistance of
corrupt Vietnam ese Government officials. W ith the growing num ber of
Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving on the shores o f Asian countries the
Australian Government, mirroring the US Government, announced in
early 1982 that it would examine each asylum seeker’s claim for refugee
status on a case-by-case basis, rather than giving refugee status to all
Indochinese asylum seekers. Shortly after the arrival o f the large
freighters in southeast Asia a new term began to be bandied around—
the “economic refugee”. At this time for m any resettlement countries it
became fairly clear that a sizable proportion of Indochinese asylum
seekers, especially amongst the Vietnamese boat people, had fled their
countries for economic rather than political reasons, and thus were at
best economic, rather than political, refugees.
Also in 1982 the Australian Government took the first immigrants
from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) which was
initiated in 1979 following negotiations between the Government o f the
Socialist Republic ofVietnam and the UNHCR. Unlike in the United States,
all Vietnamese leaving Vietnam under this programme, which in Australia
is now termed the “Vietnamese Family M igration Programme” , entered
Australia as immigrants and not as refugees. The almost three year delay
between the signing of the Memorandum o f Understanding between the
UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government, and the first arrival in Australia
of emigrants from Vietnam under the ODP was due to the finalisation o f
procedural matters. However, it should be noted that between 1976 and
1982 several hundred Vietnamese nationals were able to emigrate from
Vietnam to Australia under normal migration channels, although it
should be noted also that the m ajority o f these people had been given
entry visas to Australia prior to 30 April 1975.
During the late 1970s under the Fraser Government, Australia’s
principal goals with respect to the Indochinese asylum seekers were:
firstly to improve Australia’s image internationally, especially with the
ASEAN countries: and secondly, to act to prevent adverse domestic
opinion which arose each tim e Vietnam ese boat people arrived
unannounced on Australian shores. W hen reports began to emerge in
the late 1970s that boats carrying Vietnamese refugees had been pushed
off from the shores o f some o f the ASEAN countries, the Australian
Government did not publicly condemn these actions as strongly as did
other W estern governments, and indicated that the problem w as with
the Vietnam ese Government, and that the international com m unity
should be more understanding of the difficult position of the developing
ASEAN countries. Such action on the part of the Fraser Governm ent was
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to indicate its condem nation o f the V ietnam ese Governm ent and support
o f ASEAN’s position on the boat people, which would assist in im proving
A u stralia’s relations w ith the nations o f the region. The adoption o f this
position w a s to ensure also that Vietnam ese boat people w ould be
prevented from arriving in Australia unannounced, and w ould ensure
that the F raser G overnm ent acquired both dom estic and international
benefit. T h e Fraser Governm ent took account o f both dom estic and
international factors in determ ining its Indochinese refugee policies,
while at the sam e tim e approaching the issue w ith som e sem blance o f
hum anitarianism .
The Hawke Government's Disengagement: 1983-1990
B y the m id -1980s the w orld ’s attention had drifted aw ay from the
plight o f the V ietnam ese boat people and the Cam bodian refugees along
the Thailand-C am bodia border. The w orld’s m edia had not bothered
about the situation o f the Lao and Hm ong refugees in Thailand.
A m erica’s w ar in Laos has been labelled a “secret w ar” and thus very few
people in the W est knew about the existence o f Laos or A m erica’s m ilitary
involvem ent there in the early 1960s. A t the sam e time, the principal
Indochinese refugee resettlem ent countries o f Australia, Canada, France
and th e U S A b e g a n to experience what h asb ecom e known as com passion
fatigue, their desire to resettle enthusiastically, an apparently never
ending stream o f Indochinese asylum seekers, especially Vietnam ese
boat people, w aned significantly. Th is decreased enthusiasm m ay be
m easured by a gradual decline in each cou n try’s Indochinese refugee
quota or ceiling. A u stralia w as not an exception to the gradu al
disengagem ent o f resettlin g Indochinese refugees. However, through its
then M inister for Foreign Affairs, and now Governor-General, Bill
Hayden, A u stralia strongly sought a diplom atic solution to the conflict
in Cam bodia, w hich w as perceived as an im portant first step in the
resolution o f the Indochinese refugee problem . Indeed, from the late
1970s to the m id 1980s the situation o f the Indochinese refugees had
m oved from a crisis to a problem that refused to go away.
In its desire to play a leading active role in seeking a settlem ent
to the C am bodian problem , and in an effort to obtain substantial
regional support for its initiatives, Australia accepted few er Indochinese
refugees, but the proportional decrease in the Australian intake w as not
as high as that o f the other principal resettlem ent countries. A policy o f
gradual disengagem ent w as im plem ented in order to use the Indochinese
refugee issue in discussions on the Cam bodian situation w ith the ASEAN
countries. In an effort to be in a favourable position to take the initiative
in the resolution o f the Cam bodian problem the new ly elected Labor
G overnm ent, under Prim e M inister Robert Hawke, decided in 1983,
under a recom m endation o f the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs, to resettle
a greater proportion o f Indochinese refugees from Thailand, w here the
m ajority o f the Indochinese refugees w ere to be found.

The Indochinese Refugee Problem .

93

A n oth er o f the Hawke G overnm ent’s principal foreign policy
objectives w as to substantially im prove relations w ith Vietnam , w hile at
the sam e tim e strengthening relations w ith the other A sian countries.
Both o f these objectives were achieved over the follow ing seven years,
though it is im portant to note that A u stralia’s initiatives tow ards both
im proving relations with Vietnam and seeking a solution to the Cam bodian
conflict, som ew hat dam aged relation s w ith the ASEAN countries,
especially during 1984-1986. A n oth er dam aging issue w as w hat has
com e to be called the A sian Im m igration D ebate, or, the Blainey Debate,
so-called after the Melbourne U niversity historian. Professor G eoffrey
Blainey, w ho initiated the debate in March 1984.
T h e very em otional, public A sian Im m igration D ebate w as
essentially about the perceived high level o f Asian im m igration to
Australia. D uring m ost o f the 1980s about 35-40 per cent o f A u stra lia ’s
annual im m igrant intake was com prised o f A sian -b o m im m igrants, a
level w hich som e Australians perceived as being too high. One o f the
international repercussions of this debate, which w as w idely reported in
the A sian m edia, w as that Australia w as again being perceived as a racist
country, and the notion o f the officially defunct W hite A u stralia Policy
was m entioned occasionally in the A sian media. The debate on the level
o f A sian im m igration has waxed and w aned since 1984, though the
dam age done to A u stralia’s im age in A sia w as perceived to be substantial
enough to w arrant action. One initiative taken was to m aintain the
intake o f Indochinese refugees at a reasonable level, while con cu rrently
not chan gin g im m igration policy in effect to decrease the overall level o f
A sian im m igration to Australia. Such action w as perceived b y the
G overnm ent as dem onstrating to A sian countries that A u stralia w as not
racist, and w as still w illing to resettle Indochinese refugees at a fairly
constant level at a time when other resettlem ent countries were reducing
their intake o f Indochinese refugees. T his action together with A u stralia’s
reaching a consensus with the ASEAN countries on the C am bodia
conflict assisted in Australia regaining its influence in the ASEAN region,
indicating as they did that its initiatives on the Cam bodian conflict were
for the benefit o f the Asian region and dem onstrating that Australia w as
not a racist country.
Partly as a result of the Asian Im m igration Debate and other
dom estic factors a non Governm ent com m ittee was convened in late
1987 to report to the Governm ent on future directions for A u stralia’s
im m igration policies. The Committee to Advise on Australia’s Im m igration
Policies, which w as chaired by D r Stephen Fitzgerald, A u stra lia ’s first
am bassador to the People’s Republic o f China and an internationally
renowned Sinologist, reported to the Governm ent in m id -1988. One o f
the reports recom m endations w as that Australia should gradually
d is e n g a g e it s e lf fro m In d o c h in e s e re fu g e e re s e ttle m e n t. T h is
recom m endation appears to have derived from a negative im age o f
Indochinese, especially Vietnam ese, refugees in Australia and a g ro w in g
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opposition to ongoing Indochinese refugee resettlem ent w ith in the
Departm ent o f Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs.
However, the Hawke Governm ent was quick to indicate that it would not
follow this recom m endation, a decision which was taken in response to
substantial pressure from the Departm ent o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade.
D uring the late 1980s Australia began working very closely with
the ASEAN countries on a solution to the Cam bodia conflict. Associated
with a resolution o f this conflict was the Indochinese asylum seekers
issue. By early 1989 Australia had essentially reached a consensus with
the ASEAN countries both on the m ethod o f resolving the Cam bodian
conflict and the problem of the Indochinese asylum seekers. During
1989-1990 Australia continued to liaise closely with the ASEAN countries
on the resolution o f the Cam bodian conflict. A t the Ju ly 1989 Geneva
conference on Indochinese asylum seekers Australia, with the ASEAN
countries, voted “for" the m andatory repatriation o f Vietnam ese asylum
seekers, opposing the Governm ents o f the United States, the Soviet
Union and Vietnam . During subsequent international m eetings on the
issue o f the Indochinese asylum seekers, Australia and the ASEAN
countries continued to oppose the United States on the issue o f
m andatory repatriation o f Vietnam ese asylum seekers.
A n im portant outcom e o f the Ju ly 1989 Geneva conference w as
that Australia com m itted itself to resettling 11,000 long-term Vietnam ese
boat people during 1989-1992. This initiative cam e from the D epartm ent
o f Foreign A ffairs and Trade, not the Departm ent o f Im m igration, Local
Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs. W hile this decision obviously pleased
the ASEAN countries, as well as Hong Kong, not all sections o f the
Vietnam ese com m unity, and som e o f those involved with resettling
Indochinese refugees, are pleased with this decision. C urrently m ost o f
those providing services to the Indochinese com m unities have severely
over-burdened w ork loads, and the prospect o f settling 11,000 long-term
refugees, the m ajority o f whom have been in cam ps for over five years and
do not have relatives in Australia, is daunting.
In late 1989 a new problem appeared on the horizon o f A u stralia’s
Indochinese refugee program me; a boat load o f Cam bodian asylum
seekers landed on Australian shores, and by m id -1990 two additional
boatloads had arrived. Australia was quick to dispatch envoys to
Indonesia in an attem pt to persuade the Indonesian Governm ent to hold
any C am bodian boat people who sought asylum in Australia. W ith an
increasing num ber o f Cam bodian and Vietnam ese boat people arriving
on Indonesian shores, m any o f w hom have been pushed o ff from
Malaysia, and a decreasing num ber o f refugees being resettled in third
countries, there is little incentive for the Indonesian Governm ent to hold
Indochinese boat people headed for Australia, as it has done in the past.
A t present, there are also strong indications that Australia will stop
accepting refugees from Laos (as o f Septem ber 1990). Australia's decision
to resettle 11,000 long-term Vietnam ese boat people during 1989-1992
m ay end up causing m ore problem s than it solves for the Governm ent.
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Since the Hawke Governm ent cam e to office in 1983 A u stralia’s
policy on the Indochinese asylum seekers has been very closely associated
with the desire to find a solution to the Cam bodian conflict and improve
relations with Asia, especially the newly industrialising ASEAN countries.
Despite grow ing dom estic opposition to resettling more Indochinese
refugees, both on the part o f the public and from with in some Governm ent
departments, Australia’s annual intake o f Indochinese refugees has
rem ained around 6-7,000 persons per annum for m ost o f the life o f the
H aw ke G o v e rn m en t. D u rin g th is tim e, in te rn a tio n a l p o litic a l
considerations have been the param ount driving force behind A u stralia’s
Indochinese refugee policy, with dom estic and hum anitarian factors
being seem ingly less important over time.
Discussion and Conclusion
The changes in Australia’s Indochinese refugee policy since early
1975 have been influenced by a variety o f international and dom estic
political considerations. On the domestic side such factors as com m unity
attitudes to the acceptance o f the Indochinese refugees, the general
economic situation and various public debates relating to im m igration
in general, and since 1984 Asian im m igration in particular, have been
of concern. Internationally, Australia’s response to the Indochinese
refugee problem has been based on developments in the three Indochinese
countries, the refugee situation in the Asian countries o f first asylum,
the attitudes o f the other principal Indochinese refugee resettlem ent
countries, especially Canada and the USA and the subsequent pressure
placed on the Australian Government by the Governm ents o f the US and
the ASEAN countries. Since the m id-1980s the perceived damage done
to Australia’s reputation in Asia as result o f the widely reported Asian
im m igration debates in the Asian m edia has also been a factor for
consideration. Thus the determination o f Australia’s Indochinese refugee
policy has had to take into account a complex, and at times contradictory,
set o f international and domestic considerations, often with the strength
of the international factors out-weighing the politically sensitive and
potentially dam aging domestic considerations. Indeed, it m ay be said
that there were times when the Australian Governm ent’s Indochinese
refugee policy was in direct confrontation with dom estic political
considerations. A t the same time, A u stralia’s policy tow ards the
Indochinese refugees, especially the Vietnam ese boat people, has been
diam etrically opposed to Australia’s refugee philosophy and other
aspects o f the governm ent’s overall im m igration policies.
Australia’s apparent reluctance to take Cambodian, Hm ong and
Lao refugees extended from a b elief that the m ajority o f these refugees
were o f rural or unskilled backgrounds, and thus would find it nearly
impossible to integrate into industrial and post-industrial Australian
society. Those refugees from Cambodia and Laos who would have been
suited for resettlem ent in Australia, that is the educated and the skilled,
were perceived as probably having a knowledge o f French rather than
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English, and thus w ould be m ore suitable for resettlem ent in Canada or
France. There was a perception also that the m ajority o f the Vietnam ese
boat people were from the urban localities in southern Vietnam , and
thus would be able to integrate readily into Australian society. It w as also
the opinion o f som e policy m akers that refugees from C am bodia and
Laos w ould be w illing to return to their hom elands once the econom ic
and political situations in these countries stabilised. Not only w as this
position all too vague, but it also exhibited a lack o f understanding o f the
com plex socio-historical situations in these two countries, especially
with respect to Laos.
The country o f origin o f the refugees to be selected was the
subject o f discussions, as well as strong disagreem ents, betw een the
D epartm ent o f Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic A ffairs and
the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade. The acceptance o f m any o f
the C am bodian refugees in the early to m id -1980s appears to be a victory
for the D epartm ent o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, as the D epartm ent o f
Im m igration, Local Governm ent and Ethnic Affairs perceived that the
Cam bodians, as w ell as the Lao, were largely uninlegratable due to their
poor level o f hum an capital. From an econom ic perspective these
perceptions w ere to be proven wrong, as data from the 1986 Australian
Census o f Population and Housing indicated that Lao-Australians were
the m ost econom ically successful o f the Indochinese refugee communities,
with the C am bodian-Australians only m arginally less successful than
the Vietnam ese-Australians.
The decision to select Indochinese refugees from specific first
asylum countries w as determ ined b y a com plex set o f econom ic,
geopolitical and historical factors, foreign governm ental pressure and
perceptions o f which refugees would m ost readily integrate into Australian
society. U nder international pressure in the m id-1970s, prim arily from
the UNHCR and the US Governm ent, Australia accepted the m ajority o f
its Indochinese refugees from Thailand. W ith the com m encem ent o f the
m ajor exodus o f Vietnam ese boat people in 1978 Australia started taking
a large nu m ber o f refugees from M alaysia, again m ainly due to
international pressure and A u stralia’s historical Com m onwealth and
m ilitary links with Malaysia. A fter a num ber o f Vietnam ese boats arrived
on Australian shores in 1978-79 a significant proportion o f the Indochinese
refugee intake cam e from Indonesia. In the early 1980s, as international
pressure m ounted to assist the resettlem ent o f the growing num ber o f
Cam bodian refugees, Australia again redirected part o f its attention to
Thailand, though Indonesia and M alaysia rem ained the m ain source o f
Indochinese refugees. These three countries were to continue through
the 1980s a sb ein g the m ain source o f Indochinese refugees for Australia.
From the beginning o f 1990 about 37 per cent o f the Indochinese
refugees resettled in Australia cam e from Malaysia, 30 per cent from
Thailand (o f w hich about one-third were Vietnam ese), 16 per cent from
Indonesia, six per cent from H ong Kong and four per cent from the
Philippines.

The Indochinese Refugee Problem

97

In th e early 1980s A u stralia cam e u n d er som e criticism for on ly
taking the cream o f the refugees and rejecting the elderly and uneducated.
Indeed this practice had been goin g on since the late 1970s, and for a
short period du ring 1978-79 som e A u stralian im m igration officers
w orkin g in M alaysia deliberately split fam ilies in order to select you n g
single fem ales fo r en try to Australia. A fte r increasing criticism o f
A u stra lia ’s acceptance procedures from som e first asylum govern m en ts
and A u stra lia n com m u nity grou p s actively involved in th e resettlem en t
o f Indochin ese refugees, the G overnm en t decided that a sm all p rop ortion
o f the refugees to be resettled w ou ld be difficult to settle cases. H ow ever,
the m ajority o f these difficult to settle cases had fam ily m em b ers in
A u stralia w h o w ere able to assist w ith th eir resettlem ent.
In conclu sion, the m ain driving force behind A u s tra lia ’s policy
tow ards the Indochinese refugees over the past decade and a h a lf has
been international political considerations, especially based on the
relations b etw een the A u stralian G overnm en t and the ASEAN countries.
H owever, th e m ain factor lim iting the level o f A u stra lia ’s respon se to the
Indochinese refugee problem w as dom estic political con sideration s,
especially the poten tial dom estic political backlash if too m an y refu gees
w ere accepted. O nly in a few instances have gen u ine h u m an itarian
con sid eration s com e into play. T h is is highlighted even m ore w h en one
con siders the recent decision to accept 11,000 V ietn am ese lon g-stayers
from A sia n refugee cam ps, at a tim e w h en dom estic resettlem en t
resources can ju s t cope with those resettled in Australia, and w h en
A u stralian unem ploym ent is increasing and un em ploym en t w ith in the
V ietn a m ese-b o m com m u nity is in the ord er o f 30-35 per cent.

